Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper further studies a model of information elicitation due to Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz [13], where the introduction of sequential mechanisms results in more efficiency than the classical simultaneous mechanism design approach entails. Whereas the original work focused on anonymous function and settings where information is distributed independently across agents we extend the results to arbitrary environments and functions. JEL classification: C72, D70, D82
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 42 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013