Second-degree Price Discrimination with a Continuum of Types

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چکیده

Assumptions • There is a continuum of types; specifically, a consumer’s type, θ, is an element of the real interval [θ0, θ1]. • Marginal cost is a constant, c. • Because marginal cost is a constant, there is no loss of generality in considering a single consumer whose type is drawn from the distribution F (·) : [θ0, θ1]. • Assume F (·) is differentiable. Let f(·) be the derivative (the density function). Assume f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. • A type-θ consumer’s utility is b(x, θ)− T , where x is consumption of the good in question and T is the amount paid to the firm (the price of a package with x units in it).

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تاریخ انتشار 2005