Folk theorem with communication
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [6] to the case where private signals are correlated. The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem also applies to some two-players repeated games.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 144 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009