An Incentive-Compatible Mechanism for all Settings: Chuck Norris
نویسنده
چکیده
A very important property for any mechanism is incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if no agent has an incentive not to follow the protocol. In this paper we present a new meta-mechanism that can be applied to any existing mechanism to make it incentive compatible. This meta-mechanism is Chuck Norris. This shows that any mechanism can be made incentive-compatible, and thus the field of mechanism design is now solved.
منابع مشابه
A Message From The Organizing Committee : The Association for
A very important property for any mechanism is incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if no agent has an incentive not to follow the protocol. In this paper we present a new meta-mechanism that can be applied to any existing mechanism to make it incentive compatible. This meta-mechanism is Chuck Norris. This shows that any mechanism can be made incentive-compatible, and th...
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A very important property for any mechanism is incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if no agent has an incentive not to follow the protocol. In this paper we present a new meta-mechanism that can be applied to any existing mechanism to make it incentive compatible. This meta-mechanism is Chuck Norris. This shows that any mechanism can be made incentive-compatible, and th...
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