DCF-S: A Dynamic Coalition Formation Scheme for Rational Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce the notion, issues, and challenges of dynamic coalition formation (DCF) among agents in open, heterogeneous and world widely distributed environments. Results achieved in the traditional field of static coalition formation are briefly discussed, as well as the desired results in the new research field of DCF. We propose a simulation-based DCF scheme, called DCF-S, to be applied to any multiagent system acting in environments in which agents face imperfect information on tasks and society. Using this scheme each agent attempts to form task-oriented coalitions with other agents it knows about. Coalition leading agents are continuously striving to improve their coalition by simulation of potential alternatives in case agents leave or enter the scene, or tasks are changed by the users. In this paper we outline and discuss the simulation-based scheme for dynamic coalition formation.
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Issues of Dynamic Coalition Formation Among Rational Agents
We introduce the notion, issues, and challenges of dynamic coalition formation (DCF) among rational software agents in open, heterogeneous and world widely distributed environments such as the Internet and Web. Selected relevant approaches coping with only parts of the DCF problem domain in different disciplines such as decision theory, social reasoning, and machine learning are briefly discuss...
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