A Study of the Internal Organisation of a Bidding Cartel∗
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper examines data on bidding in over 1700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel (or ring) of stamp dealers in the 1990s. The knockout was conducted using a variant of the nested knockout studied by Graham, Marshall and Richard (1990). An examination of the data reveals considerable heterogeneity among bidders, providing possible motivation for the choice of ring mechanism. Damages, induced inefficiency and the return to the ring are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000). A notable finding is that non-ring bidders suffered damages that were likely of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers.
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تاریخ انتشار 2007