Composable Security of Delegated Quantum Computation

Delegating difficult computations to remote large computation facilities, with appropriate security guarantees, is a possible solution for the ever-growing needs of personal computing power. For delegated computation protocols to be usable in a larger context—or simply to securely run two protocols in parallel— the security definitions need to be composable. Here, we define composable security for delegated quantum computation, and prove that several known protocols are composable, including Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi’s Universal Blind Quantum Computation protocol. We distinguish between protocols which provide only blindness— the computation is hidden from the server— and those that are also verifiable — the client can check that it has received the correct result. We show that the composable security definition capturing both these notions can be reduced to a combination of two distinct stand-alone security definitions. ∗[email protected] †[email protected] ‡[email protected] §[email protected]