Bayesian Games with Unawareness and Unawareness Perfection∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents’ awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness.
منابع مشابه
Subjective Reasoning – Games with Unawareness
The subjective framework for reasoning is extended to incorporate the representation of unawareness in games. Both unawareness of actions and decision makers are modeled as well as reasoning about others’ unawareness. It is shown that a small grain of uncertainty about unawareness with rational decision makers can lead to cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. JEL Classificati...
متن کاملUniversal type structures with unawareness
Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in standard games. A natural question is whether each hierarchy describes the player’s awareness of the hierarchies of other players and beliefs over these, or whether the reasoning can continue indefinitely. This paper constructs the universal type structure with unawareness where eac...
متن کاملSelf-confirming Games: Unawareness, Discovery, and Equilibrium
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steadystates of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are “self-destroying” as a player’s representation of the game must change after playing it once. We define discovery processes where at each state there is an extensiveform...
متن کاملUnawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games
Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s framework of dynamic psychological games and the recent progress in the modeling of dynamic unawareness, we provide a general framework that allows for unawareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by belief-dependent psychological preferences like reciprocity and guilt. We show that unawareness has a pervasive impact on the strateg...
متن کاملUnawareness - A gentle introduction to both the literature and the special issue
This article provides a brief survey of the literature on unawareness and introduces the contributions to the special issue on unawareness in Mathematical Social Sciences. First, we provide a brief overview both about epistemic models of unawareness and models of extensive-form games with unawareness. Instead of introducing the approaches in full detail, we illustrate the main differences and s...
متن کامل