Outlines of a Pedagogical Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Two Truths Doctrine
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper proposes an interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths that considers saṃvṛti and paramārtha-satya two visions of reality on which the Buddhas, for soteriological and pedagogical reasons, build teachings of two types: respectively in agreement with (for example, the teaching of the Four Noble Truths) or in contrast to (for example, the teaching of emptiness) the category of svabhāva. The early sections of the article show to what extent the various current interpretations of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the dve satye—despite their sometimes even macroscopic differences—have a common tendency to consider the notion of śūnyatā as a teaching not based on, but equivalent to supreme truth. This equivalence—philologically questionable—leads to interpretative paths that prove inevitably aporetic: indeed, according to whether the interpretation of śūnyatā is ‘metaphysical’ or ‘anti-metaphysical’, it gives rise to readings of Nāgārjuna’s thought incompatible, respectively, with anti-metaphysical and realistic types of verses traceable in the works of the author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK). On the contrary, by giving more emphasis to the expression samupāśritya (“based on”), which recurs in MMK.24.8, and therefore, by epistemologically separating the notion of śūnyatā from the notion of paramārtha-satya (and of some of its conceptual equivalents such as nirvāṇa, tattva and dharmatā), we may obtain an interpretation—at once realistic and anti-metaphysical—of the theory of the two truths compatible with the vast majority (or even totality) of Nāgārjuna’s verses.
منابع مشابه
The Doctrine of Univocity Is True and Salutary
I shall confine my attention to the one Scotist doctrine that seems to be singled out as especially worrisome, the doctrine of univocity. In the first part of the paper I argue that the doctrine of univocity is true. So even if the doctrine has unwelcome consequences, we ought to affirm it anyway; it is not the job of the theologian or philosopher to shrink from uncomfortable truths. In the sec...
متن کاملA new problem for the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth∗
My target in this paper is a view that has sometimes been called the ‘Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth’ (L-DONT) and sometimes ‘Conventionalism about Necessity’. It is the view that necessity is grounded in the meanings of our expressions—meanings which are sometimes identified with the conventions governing those expressions—and that our knowledge of that necessity is based on our knowle...
متن کاملThe Quest for Ethical Truth: Wang Yangming on the Unity of Knowing and Acting
Drawing an analogy between Wang Yangming’s endeavor to know ethical truth and Descartes’ quest for epistemic certainty, this paper proposes a reading of Wang's doctrine of the unity of knowing and acting to the effect that the doctrine does not express an ethical teaching about how the knowledge that is already acquired is to be related to acting, but an epistemological claim as to how we know ...
متن کاملPain and its Ending: The Four Noble Truths in the Therav!da Buddhist Canon
This is a well-presented and clearly written book, based on a wide reading of both recent and older scholarship. Carol Anderson gives a detailed account of the various guises in which the four noble truths appear in the P!li texts. Overall, this is a valuable and intelligent account of the material, and it will, I suspect, be required reading in Buddhist studies courses for some time. That said...
متن کاملCittamātra as Conventional Truth from Śāntarakṣita to Mipham 111012
Śāntarakṣita is best known for his synthesis of the apparently conflicting schools of Madhyamaka and Cittamātra in his Madhyamakālaṃkāra, or Ornament of the Middle Way. (Blumenthal 2004) In that text, he famously argues that while Cittamātra is true conventionally, Madhyamaka reveals the ultimate truth. Hence the rubric of the two truths, a familiar device for reconciling apparent contradiction...
متن کامل