Evolution of sanctioning systems and opting out of games of life

نویسندگان

  • Tatsuya Sasaki
  • Satoshi Uchida
  • Voltaire Cang
  • Xiaojie Chen
چکیده

In explaining altruistic cooperation and punishment, the challenging riddle is how transcendental rules can emerge within the empirical world. Recent game-theoretical studies show that pool punishment, in particular second-order punishment, plays a key role in understanding the evolution of cooperation. Second-order pool punishment, however, is tautological in nature: the punishment system itself is caused by its own effects. The emergence of pool punishment poses a logical conundrum that to date has been overlooked in the study of the evolution of social norms and institutions. Here we tackle the issue by considering the interplay of (a) cognitive biases in reasoning and (b) Agamben’s notion of homo sacer (Agamben, G. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford Univ. Press), that is, a person who may be killed without legal consequence. Based on cognitive disposition of reversing the cause-and-effect relationship, then we propose a new system: preemptive punishment of homo sacers. This action can lead to retrospectively forming moral assessment in particular for second-order pool punishment.

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تاریخ انتشار 2014