Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback
نویسندگان
چکیده
T majority of reverse auctions for procurement use a single-attribute (price) format while providing constraints on nonprice attributes such as quality and lead time. Alternatively, a buyer could choose to conduct a multiattribute auction where bidders can specify both a price and levels of nonprice attributes. While such an auction may provide higher theoretical utility to the buyer, it is not clear that this theoretical improvement will be realized given the increased complexity of the auction. In this research, we present an ascending auction mechanism for a buyer whose utility function is known and dependent on three attributes. Motivated by a supply chain procurement problem setting, we consider quality and lead time for the two attributes in addition to price. The auction mechanism provides the bidders with restricted feedback regarding the buyer’s utility function. We explore, experimentally, the performance of this multiattribute auction mechanism as compared to a price-only auction mechanism. Compared with the price-only auction, we find that our mechanism design is effective in increasing both buyer utility and bidder (supplier) profits.
منابع مشابه
Computational Feedback Mechanisms for Iterative Multiunit Multiattribute Auctions
Traditionally firms aiming to achieve competition among suppliers have used sealed bidding procedures in their procurement processes. However, the advances in computational technologies now allow companies to use different and more complex auction mechanisms for their sourcing needs. The multiattribute auction is a mechanism that allows negotiation over multiple characteristics of a contract in...
متن کاملBetter , Faster , Cheaper : A Multi - Attribute Supply Chain Auction Mechanism
The use of reverse auctions for procurement activities has grown tremendously over the last several years. The majority of these auctions use a single dimension (price) format while providing constraints on non-price attributes such as quality and lead time. In this research, we present an auction mechanism for a buyer whose utility function is known and dependent on three attributes: price, qu...
متن کاملSelecting Efficient Service-providers in Electric Power Distribution Industry Using Combinatorial Reverse Auction
In this paper, a combinatorial reverse auction mechanism is proposed for selecting the most efficient service-providers for resolving sustained power interruptions in multiple regions of an electric power distribution company’s responsibility area. Through this mechanism, supplying the required service in each region is assigned to only one potential service-provider considering two criteria in...
متن کاملModels for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
M auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight, color, and terms of delivery, in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods. This paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special (preferential independent) a...
متن کاملInformation Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions
We investigate tradeoffs among expressiveness, operational cost, and economic efficiency for a class of multiattribute double-auction markets. To enable polynomial-time clearing and information feedback operations, we restrict the bidding language to a form of multiattribute OR-of-XOR expressions. We then consider implications of this restriction in environments where bidders’ preferences lie w...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Management Science
دوره 51 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005