Optimal group strategyproof cost sharing∗
نویسنده
چکیده
Units of a good are produced at some symmetric cost. A mechanism elicits agents’ willingness to pay for one unit of the good, allocates some goods to some agents, and covers the cost by charging those agents. We introduce the generalized average cost mechanism (GAC) for arbitrary symmetric cost functions. GAC is the only Pareto selection among group strategyproof mechanisms that treat equal agents equally, or are population monotonic in the utility profile, or are population monotonic in the cost function. No group strategyproof mechanism is efficient (including GAC), even if it has a budget surplus. However, GAC minimizes the worst absolute surplus loss among GSP mechanism.
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