The Ontological Presuppositions of the Ontological Argument*

JLhe most recent stage in the analysis of St. Anselm's Ontologi cal Argument is the modal-logical stage : if one wants to get clear as to what is wrong (or right) with it, one should phrase it in S5.1 I have misgivings about this maneuver, if it is claimed in the name of historical exegesis. While I think that the connnections between the Ontological Argument and modal logic are insightful and exciting, I also think that the arguments presently offered in Anselm's name, even though they might be better than his, are revisionary or revolutionary. What I wish to do in this paper is reactionary. I shall first set out what I take to be the argu ment contained in Proslogion II. I shall then point out that the argument rests on a set of assumptions which reveal a conceptual scheme different from that of the sober, twentieth century modal logician. Finally, I shall show that the assumptions in question lead to a novel criticism of Anselm's argument, a criticism that does not require of us, for instance, that we deny that "exists" is a predicate.