Competition in Treasury Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a ``natural experiment'' causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction revenue and compare bidder surplus before and after the auction. We find a significant effect on the surplus earned by bidders as a result of increased competition that is however small when compared to reduced form estimates. We explain this difference by a change in the distribution of valuations. We also show that with increased competition the efficiency concerns and auction format play a smaller role.
منابع مشابه
Competition in Austrian Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a “natural experiment” causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the increased number in bidders caused a significant drop in the yields Austria had to pay for newly issued debt. We use structural...
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