Reasoned Assumptions and Pareto Optimality

Default and non-monotonic inference rule* are not really epistemological statements, but are instead desires or preferences of the agent about the makeup of Its own mental state (cpistemic or otherwise). The fundamental relation in non-monotonic logic is not so mum self-knowledge as self-choice or self-determination, and the fundamental justification of the interpretations and structures involved come from decision theory and economics rather than from logic and epistemoiogy. December 17, 1984 Revised January 29, 1985 © Copyright 1984, 1985 by Jon Doyle. For presentation at IJCAI-85. This paper is based on a talk presented at the CSLI Workshop on Planning and Practical Reasoning, Stanford University, June 1984. I thank Joseph Schatz for his advice and comments, and Monnett ITanvcy and one of the IJGAI referees for discovering an error in an earlier draft. This research was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DOD), A ft PA Order No. 3597, monitored by the Air Force Avionics Laboratory under Contract F33G15-81-K-1539. Trie views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the author, and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the Government of the United States of America.