When I and me are different: Assimilation and contrast in temporal self-comparisons

In two studies, we show that comparisons with past or possible future selves shape current self-evaluation and that the direction of this influence is determined by one’s current comparison focus. In Study 1, participants primed to focus on similarities versus dissimilarities were asked to remember an introverted or extraverted past self and then to evaluate their current level of extraversion. Participants who focused on similarities assimilated current self-evaluations to the past self, whereas those who focused on dissimilarities contrasted current self-evaluations away from the past self. In Study 2, participants imagined a possible future self that differed from their current self in terms of body weight. Participants who imagined a moderate weight change exhibited assimilation to the possible self, whereas those who imagined an extreme weight change exhibited contrast. These studies highlight the important role cognitive factors such as comparison focus play in shaping the consequences of temporal self-comparisons. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. People frequently compare themselves to what they were like in the past or what they may be like in the future. When evaluating her academic skills, for example, a college student may note the fact that her grade point average is not as high as it was in high school. Or she might evaluate her current grade point average relative to the one she hopes to attain next semester. Not only do people frequently engage in such temporal self-comparisons, they seem to do so as often – or even more often – than they engage in social comparisons (Wilson & Ross, 2000). Yet despite the ubiquity of temporal self-comparisons in everyday life, relatively little research has focused on the consequences of these comparisons for self-evaluation. The main exception is work inspired by Wilson and Ross’ (2001) temporal self-appraisal theory (Haddock, 2004, 2006; Haynes et al., 2007; Kanten & Teigen, 2008; Ross & Wilson, 2002; Sanna, Chang, Carter, & Small, 2006). According to this theory, people derogate past selves as a way to feel good about the current self. The idea is that by believing they are more attractive, kind or responsible than they used to be, people can maintain an illusion of continuous self-improvement. This is only the case for distant past selves, however, as recent past selves presumably have implications for current self-evaluation. Indeed, as Ross and Wilson (2002) have shown, people actively distance themselves from former failures relative to former successes in order to protect their largely positive views of the current self. Temporal self-appraisal theory provides a useful framework for understanding the influence of motivational forces on the interplay between current and past selves. But this theory mainly focuses on how the need to maintain positive selfviews in the present influences the perception of past selves, rather than how past (or possible future) selves influence current self-perceptions. Moreover, in addition to motivational factors, cognitive processes are key in shaping judgmental rtment Psychologie, Universität zu Köln, Gronewaldstrasse 2, 50931 Köln, Germany. s, Ltd. Received 1 October 2008 Accepted 4 February 2009 Temporal self-comparisons 161 outcomes. How might we expect cognitive processes to affect the way in which temporal self-comparisons influence current self-views? One clue can be found in research on social comparison. An abundance of research has shown that social comparisons typically influence self-evaluation in one of two ways: sometimes, judgments of the self are assimilated toward the judgmental standard; at other times, judgments of the self are contrasted away from the standard (see Biernat, 2005; Mussweiler, 2003 for recent overviews). Moreover, one’s current comparison focus—whether one is focused on similarities or dissimilarities between the self and standard—seems to be a key factor in determining which of these two judgmental outcomes occurs. The mechanisms underlying this process are outlined in detail in Mussweiler’s (2003) Selective Accessibility Model (SAM). Briefly, whether a given comparison leads to assimilation or contrast depends upon the hypothesis an individual tests during the comparison process. In testing the hypothesis that self and standard are similar, he or she selectively activates knowledge indicating self-standard similarity. In testing the hypothesis that self and standard are different, he or she selectively activates knowledge indicating selfstandard dissimilarity. This activated knowledge is then used as input for the final judgment, leading to assimilation in the case of similarity testing, and contrast in the case of dissimilarity testing. Numerous research findings support the predictions of the SAM (see Mussweiler, 2003, 2007, for overviews). In an illustrative study (Mussweiler, 2001), participants were primed to focus on similarities or dissimilarities prior to a social comparison task. More specifically, they were first asked to examine two pictures and to list either similarities or differences between them. They were then asked to compare themselves with a student who was adjusting well or adjusting poorly to life at a new university, and to evaluate their own adjustment to university life. The results showed that the comparison focus primed in the first task carried over to the second task. Participants who initially searched for similarities assimilated their self-evaluations to the standard, judging themselves to be better adjusted to university life when the standard was well adjusted. Participants who initially searched for dissimilarities, on the other hand, contrasted their self-evaluations away from the standard. These participants judged themselves to be better adjusted to university life when the standard was poorly adjusted. Thus, one’s comparison focus at the time of judgment critically determined whether the social comparison process resulted in assimilation or contrast. To the extent that the processes underlying assimilation and contrast are similar across different types of comparisons, we should expect temporal self-comparisons to behave much like social comparisons. That is, when individuals are in a similarity focus, they should assimilate their current self-views to the relevant past or possible future self under consideration. But when in a dissimilarity focus, they should contrast their current self-views away from this past or possible future self. Thus, we expect the influence of temporal self-comparisons on the current self-concept to depend on one’s current comparison focus. Is there any evidence to support this claim? As mentioned earlier, few investigations have examined the role of cognitive processes in determining how temporal self-comparisons influence self-perception. However, two recent investigations did in fact examine the influence of past selves on perceptions of the current self (Broemer, Grabowski, Gebauer, Ermel, & Diehl, 2008; Gebauer, Broemer, Haddock, & von Hecker, 2008). Building upon Schwarz & Bless’ (1992, 2007) inclusion/exclusion model, these researchers hypothesized that recent past selves are included in the current self-representation, leading to assimilation, whereas distant past selves are excluded from the current self-representation, leading to contrast. Thus, for example, thinking of a recent past self that was high in self-esteem would lead one to see the current self as relatively high in self-esteem, but thinking of a distant past that was high in self-esteem would lead one to see the current self as relatively low in self-esteem. To test this reasoning, Broemer et al. (2008) manipulated the subjective temporal distance between the present and a past self and showed that people assimilated the current self to past selves they perceived to be recent, but contrasted the current self away from past selves they perceived to be distant. Although compatible with these results, the present perspective differs from theirs in important ways. First, whereas this previous research was concerned with how the subjective temporal distance to past selves determines their influence on the current self-concept (Broemer et al., 2008) and how chronic differences in mood moderate this influence (Gebauer et al., 2008), we are interested in how the comparison mechanisms of similarity versus dissimilarity testing shape the outcome of temporal self-comparisons. According to the SAM (Mussweiler, 2003), a focus on similarities typically leads people to assimilate the judgmental target to an accessible standard, whereas a focus on differences typically leads people to contrast the judgmental target away from an accessible standard. Thus, in the present research, first we manipulate comparison focus using two different paradigms—procedural priming and standard extremity—that have been shown to produce a focus on similarities versus differences in past research (Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008; Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004a, 2004b). Second, whereas the previous research focused specifically on past selves, Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 160–168 (2010)