Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: The Symmetric Case
نویسندگان
چکیده
It is shown that in every repeated zero-sum game of incomplete information in which the information to both players is identical, lim v n and v ∞ exist and are equal.
منابع مشابه
Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
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