Perspective-Taking in Communication: Representations of Others' Knowledge in Reference*

Much social behavior is predicated upon assumptions an actor makes about the knowledge, beliefs and motives of others. To note just a few examples, coordinated behavior of the kind found in bargaining and similar structured interactions (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Schelling, 1960) requires that participants plan their own moves in anticipation of what their partners' moves are likely to be; predicting another's moves requires extensive assumptions about what the other knows, wants, and believes. Similarly, social comparison theory (Festinger, 1950; Festinger, 1954; Woods, 1988) postulates that people evaluate their own abilities and beliefs by comparing them with the abilities and beliefs of others -typically with abilities and beliefs that are normative for relevant categories of others. In order to make such comparisons, the individual must know (or think he or she knows) how these abilities and beliefs are distributed in those populations. Reference group theory (Merton & Kitt, 1950) incorporates a similar set of assumptions. In communication, the fundamental role of knowing what others know1 is axiomatic (Bakhtin, 1981; Clark, 1985; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Graumann, 1989; Graumann & Herrmann, 1989; Krauss, 1987; Krauss & Fussell, in press-a; Krauss & Fussell, in press–b; Mead., 1934; Rommetveit, 1974). Messages are formulated