An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Binary-choice Games: Entry, Voting, Public Goods, and the Volunteers’ Dilemma
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper characterizes behavior with "noisy" decision making for a general class of N-person, binary-choice games. Applications include: participation games, voting, market entry, binary step-level public goods games, the volunteer’s dilemma, etc. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a "quantal response" equilibrium, and the resulting predictions are compared with Nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise. Many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner.
منابع مشابه
An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation
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