A dynamic spectrum management strategy based on cooperative bargaining framework

This work proposes a dynamic and fair spectrum management strategy to be adopted by a service provider (SP). Here, we consider a scenario where multiple access networks (ANs) of different (not necessarily competing) technologies are owned by a single SP. We envisage that an SP employs an entity, called local spectrum controller (LSC), which manages a common pool of spectrum and is responsible for distributing the spectrum to individual ANs in a fair manner. Since the available spectrum is inadequate to satisfy the aggregate demand from all ANs simultaneously, LSC has to employ a dynamic spectrum allocation strategy. We have modeled the problem as an n-player cooperative bargaining game and have solved the problem with the help of solution techniques namely, Nash bargaining solution (NBS), KalaiSmorodinsky bargaining solution (KSBS) and modified Thomson bargaining solution (MTBS). We have presented two novel heuristics to compute KSBS and MTBS. Moreover, a suitable utility function for the AN with respect to its received spectrum have been presented. We have also identified possible objectives of LSC (i.e., SP), namely minimizing overall dissatisfaction (MOD) of heterogeneous network, maintaining equality of distribution (MED) and maximizing proportional fairness (MPF). Finally, we have compared performances of above solutions with max–min fairness solution and Shapley value solution with respect to the above objectives of LSC. & 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.