Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project

نویسندگان

  • Eva Chen
  • Bo Yu
  • Klaus Kolitz
چکیده

Nora is a joint project between Concordia University, Canada, and University Karlsruhe, Germany, through which a group of researchers of Auction and Negotiation meet together in order to deeply investigate the differences and possible impacts of the use of different electronic market mechanisms. The objective of the project is to build a comprehensive research framework and knowledge base from multiple discipline perspectives (e.g. economics, behavioral science, psychology, information system (IS) research, computer science, etc), through continuous and accumulative work. The research under this project would bring valuable knowledge and support to businesses, helping them to do better decision in transactions, especially in the cyberspace (Malone et al., 1987), whereby the appropriate use of electronic market transaction system and mechanisms would further increase social welfare and better satisfy agents with the transaction process if possible (Smith, 1982).

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تاریخ انتشار 2006