Enhanced Security Strategies for MPLS Signaling

In an increasingly hostile environment, the need for security in network infrastructure is stronger than ever, especially for Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS), widely used to provide most of the new-generation network infrastructure-level services in the Internet. Unfortunately, the MPLS control plane lacks scalable verification for the authenticity and legitimacy of signaling messages and communication between peer routers is subject to active and passive forgery, hijacking and wiretapping activities. In this paper, we propose a robust framework for MPLS-based network survivability against security threats. The security of MPLS control plane protocols can be greatly enhanced by requiring digital signature of all the signaling messages, in accordance with a common security paradigm valid for all the protocols. Our design goals include integrity safeguarding, protection against replay attacks, and gradual deployment, with routers not supporting authentication breaking the trust chain but operating undisturbed under