Labor Market Cycles and Unemployment Insurance Eligibility
نویسندگان
چکیده
If entitlement to UI bene ts must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional bene t to an employment relationship, so it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, UI is fairly priced, and the UI system prevents moralhazard unemployed workers, the generosity of UI has no e¤ect on unemployment. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the e¤ects of UI to violation of its premises. In itself, the endogenous entitlement of UI bene ts does not resolve if the Mortensen-Pissarides model is able to generate realistic cycles. However, it brings some insights into this debate: The widespread concern in the design of UI systems to minimize moral-hazard unemployment only makes sense if workers have su¢ ciently high values of leisure (80 percent of labor productivity in our baseline calculation for the United States). The fact that the generosity of UI has potentially a small e¤ect on unemployment reconciles a high response of unemployment to changes in labor productivity with a small response to changes in UI bene ts. JEL classi cation: E24 E32 J64
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