Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment
نویسنده
چکیده
This note demonstrates epsilon equilibria in the first-price auction that achieve lower worst-case expected revenues than the lower bound proposed by Turocy (“Auction Choice for Ambiguity-Averse Sellers Facing Strategic Uncertainty,” Games and Economic Behavior 62, pp. 155–179, 2008). Additionally, it stresses the importance of a careful specification of the action space to properly characterize expected revenues when bidders systematically deviate from equilibrium play.
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Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 72 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011