Algorithms for strategyproof classification
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 25 September 2011 Received in revised form 12 March 2012 Accepted 26 March 2012 Available online 27 March 2012
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Artif. Intell.
دوره 186 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012