Nash Equilibria via Duality and Homological Selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
Cost functions in problems concerning the existence of Nash Equilibria are traditionally multilinear in the mixed strategies. The main aim of this paper is to relax the hypothesis of multilinearity. We use basic intersection theory, Poincaré Duality and the Dold-Thom Theorem to establish existence of Nash Equilibria under fairly general topological hypotheses. The Dold-Thom Theorem provides us with a homological version of a selection Theorem, which may be of independent interest.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1111.0754 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011