Revolutionaries and Spies
نویسندگان
چکیده
Let G = (V,E) be a graph and let r, s, k be natural numbers. “Revolutionaries and Spies”, G(G, r, s, k) , is the following two-player game. The sets of positions for player 1 and player 2 are V r and ∗The research of the first author was supported by BSF grant no. 2006099, and by ISF grants Nos. 779/08, 859/08 and 938/06.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Discrete Mathematics
دوره 312 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012