Group-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions
نویسنده
چکیده
We axiomatically characterize the class of pairwise irresolute social choice functions that are group-strategyproof according to Kelly’s preference extension. The class is narrow but contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the bipartisan set, thereby answering a question raised independently by Barberà (1977a) and Kelly (1977). These functions furthermore encourage participation and thus do not suffer from the no-show paradox (under Kelly’s extension).
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