Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency. 1998 ACM Subject Classification F.2.2 Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems, J.4 Social and Behavioral Sciences
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