Antitrust (Over-?) Confidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
On October 5, 2007, a group of antitrust scholars convened on Chicago’s near northside to discuss monopolization law. In the course of their freewheeling but fascinating conversation, a number of broad themes emerged. Those themes can best be understood in contrast to a body of antitrust scholarship that was born six miles to the south, at the University of Chicago. Most notably, the northside discussants demonstrate a hearty confidence in the antitrust enterprise – a confidence that is not shared by Chicago School scholars, who generally advocate a more modest antitrust. As scholars who are more sympathetic to Chicago School views, we are somewhat skeptical. While we applaud many the of the insights and inquiries raised during the conversation, and certainly this sort of discussion in general, our task in this article is to draft a critical analysis of the October 5 conversation. In particular, we critique the northside discussants (for the most part) vision of a “big” antitrust that would place equal emphasis on Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and would expand private enforcement of Section 2. ♦ Lambert is Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri; Wright is Scholar in Residence, Federal Trade Commission and Assistant Professor of Law (on leave), George Mason University.
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