The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly
نویسندگان
چکیده
We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale. 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; D43; L13
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 44 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003