Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition*

Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In this paper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model the electoral competition between two candidates as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies, and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity. Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustained in equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variable for the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the same electoral objectives end up "separating," that is, assuming different ideological positions. * We thank Salvador Barbera, Jim Fearon, Tim Feddersen, Michael Jones, Jane Marrinan, Andreu MasColell, Roger Myerson, Don Saari and especially Itzhak Gilboa for their many comments and suggestions that have improved the paper considerably. + Departament d'Economia, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Carrer Balmes 132, 08008 Barcelona (Spain). ++ Department of Economics, Boston University. Boston, MA 02215.