CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #4: The Clinching Auction∗
نویسنده
چکیده
The first scenario — identical items and unit-demand valuations — corresponds to special case in which μi(j) = 0 for all i and j ≥ 2. The second and third scenarios — which have non-identical goods but restrict to additive or unit-demand valuations, respectively — are incomparable to this one. Our goals are the usual ones — a simple ascending auction that is EPIC and in which sincere bidding leads to a welfare-maximizing allocation. Most aspects of the following solution are simpler than in the unit-demand case we just studied, but we’ll see that nonunit-demand valuations do introduce one important complication.
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تاریخ انتشار 2014