Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
نویسنده
چکیده
Strategy-proof allocation of a ®nite number of indivisible goods among a ®nite number of individuals is considered. The main result is that in a pure distributional case, a mechanism is strategy-proof, nonbossy and neutral if and only if it is serially dictatorial. If the indivisible goods are initially owned by the individuals, a mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto consistent if and only if it is the core mechanism.
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