Worst-case Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
In a system where noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the price of anarchy, which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model where several agents share a very simple network leads to some interesting mathematics, results, and open problems.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Computer Science Review
دوره 3 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1999