Strategic Voting In British Elections
نویسندگان
چکیده
Strategic Voting In British Elections In this paper we examine the extent to which voters engage in strategic behavior. Our contribution is accounting for the context in which voters have the opportunity to behave in a strategic fashion. We also demonstrate that previous measures of strategic voting significantly underestimated the willingness of voters to engage in strategic behavior when presented with the opportunity to do so. We use as cases for our study of strategic voting behavior two recent elections in Britain, the 1987 and 1997 general elections. Our analysis produces estimates of strategic voting in these elections that are substantially greater than reported in previous research.
منابع مشابه
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 a New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections
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