Cheap Talk and Authoritative Figures in Empirical Experiments ∗ Alfred Pang
نویسنده
چکیده
Cheap talk refers to non-binding, costless, non-veri able communications that agents may participate in, before or during a game. It is di cult to observe collusion through cheap talk in empirical experiements. One reason for this is our cultural programming that causes us to obey authority gures.
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