Characterizing the Acts of Righteous Gentiles A Matter of Duty or Supererogation?

This paper examines the frequently made claim by Holocaust rescuers, otherwise known as “righteous gentiles,” that they merely fulfilled their duty when they endeavored to save the Jews from Hitler and are consequently deserving of no special praise for having attempted to do so. It then argues, against the prevailing view, that there are compelling reasons for trusting this testimony. Finally, it relates this finding to contemporary discussions in ethical theory, in particular challenging J. O. Urmson’s widely influential claim that moral heroes who insist on the obligatory nature of their heroic conduct do not offer this judgment as a “piece of objective reporting,” but as a conviction that reflects a personal ideal. By contrast, this paper contends that the hero’s understanding of duty is not illusory, but, on the contrary, more enhanced than that of the majority owing to its origins in the hero’s virtuous character. Rescuers’ Conceptions of their Duty [1] To what extent should we trust the affirmations of Holocaust rescuers who, when questioned about their heroic efforts, tend to assert adamantly that they never went above and beyond the call of duty? How should we interpret claims such as, “I was only doing what anyone in my shoes would have done,” when the historical account reveals that the majority of persons who did find themselves in the shoes of a would-be rescuer became bystanders rather than incur the risks entailed in saving Jews and others from Hitler? From a common-sensical perspective, it seems plausible to suggest that rescuers are, in spite of their own views to the contrary, deserving of special praise. Indeed, common-sense intuition tells us that rescuers engaged in conduct which is admirable, but which, due to the costs involved, exceeds what we should morally require of ourselves or anyone else. This judgment is brought into even more relief if we consider that rescuing was no simple, one-time act of heroism: rescuers involved themselves in the plight of their beneficiaries in a sustained way, imperiling not only their own lives, but also those of their families throughout the duration of their efforts. [2] It is nonetheless my aim in what follows to resist the common-sensical view by arguing that we should not be so quick to dismiss denials on the part of rescuers, otherwise known as “righteous gentiles,” to those who would label their actions “supererogatory.” In particular, I seek to challenge J. O. Urmson’s widely influential claim that moral heroes who insist on the obligatory nature of their heroic conduct do not offer this judgment as a “piece of objective reporting,” but as a conviction that reflects a personal ideal that is morally good, but not morally binding (204). In contrast to this view, I claim that the hero’s understanding of duty may not necessarily be an illusory one. I seek to defend this claim in part through reference to the insights of contemporary sociologists and historians who, unlike others who have engaged in former investigations of a similar nature, have sought to account for the righteous gentile phenomenon in a manner that is in conformity with rescuers’ own self-image.