Computation of Equilibria in Finite Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for nite n-person games. Classical path following methods, such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm for two person games, and Scarf-type xed point algorithms for n-person games provide globally convergent methods for nding a sample equilibrium. For large problems, methods which are not globally convergent, such as sequential linear complementarity methods may be preferred on the grounds of speed. None of these methods are capable of characterizing the entire set of Nash equilibria. More computationally intensive methods, which derive from the theory of semi-algebraic sets are required for nding all equilibria. These methods can also be applied to compute various equilibrium re nements. JEL classi cation numbers:
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