Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Network Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
The report encompasses an overview of recent developments concerning cross-monotonic cost sharing methods, a subject that has received a lot of attention from computer scientists, mathematicians and economists recently. In particular, the results of Moulin and Shenker [12], who established the connection between group-strategyproofness and cross-monotonicity, and those of Könemann, Leonardi, and Schäfer [9], who gave a cross-monotonic cost sharing algorithm for the Steiner Forest game, are summarized. A lower bound is given for this game, showing that these results are tight, and some thoughts about the choice for cross-monotonicity are presented, based on results found in [15] and [7].
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