Social choice and the logic of simple games
نویسنده
چکیده
From the perspective of the minimal majority logic proposed by Pauly [12], we investigate the relation between axiomatic social choice theory, the logic of simple games, and neighbourhood semantics. We discuss the importance of the Rudin-Keisler ordering in this context and provide a simple characterisation of the monotonic modal fragment that corresponds to the logic of simple games based on this ordering. Finally we discuss its relevance for axiomatic social choice theory.
منابع مشابه
Why Even the Logic of Re-Defined Choice May Still Contradict the Logic of Care in Public Health Systems?
متن کامل
Comparing the Social Skills of Students Addicted to Computer Games with Normal Students
Background: This study aimed to investigate and compare the social skills of students addicted to computer games with normal students. The dependent variable in the present study is the social skills. Methods: The study population included all the students in the second grade of public secondary school in the city of Isfahan at the educational year of 2009-2010. The sample size included 564 stu...
متن کاملComplexity of comparison of influence of players in simple games
Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The possible representations of simple games considered are simple games represented by winning coalitions, minimal winning coalitions, weighted voting game or a multip...
متن کاملSocial Choice and Logic via Simple Games
ion we need, since it is clearly a property of the SAF F itself and not of any particular model based on F . This notion of validity stems from the semantics of modal logic, in which the same distinction is made between satisfaction of a formula φ as a property of models, and validity as a property of some underlying “frame”. Therefore we will look at SAFs as a variant of such modal frames. In ...
متن کاملThe Lobbying, Bribery, and Compliance: An Evolutionary Model of Social Factors
Abstract Connecting to rule-makers in order to set favorable rules (lobbying) or paying government executives to bend the current rule (bribing) are the two main strategies for influencing government. This study in an evolutionary game model explain why bribing may become widespread while other states like compliance and cooperative lobbying are Pareto superior. The theoretical model is used ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Log. Comput.
دوره 21 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011