Epistemic comparative conditionals
نویسنده
چکیده
The interest of epistemic comparative conditionals comes from the fact that they represent genuine ‘comparative epistemic relations’ between propositions, situations, evidences, abilities, interests, etc. This paper argues that various types of epistemic comparative conditionals uniformly represent comparative epistemic relations via the comparison of epistemic positions rather than the comparison of epistemic standards.
منابع مشابه
Wondering What Might Be
This paper explores the possibility of supplementing the suppositional view of indicative conditionals with a corresponding view of epistemic modals. The most striking feature of the suppositional view consists in its claim that indicative conditionals are to be evaluated by conditional probabilities. On the basis of a natural link between indicative conditionals and epistemic modals, a corresp...
متن کاملEpistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics
There has been a murder in the mansion. There are, and we all know that this is so, only three suspects: the gardener, the driver, and the butler. We believe, and we have our reasons for so believing, that if the gardener did not do it, then the driver did. We share belief in this particular conditional, and this conditional is of a particular kind. It is what Quine calls an ‘‘ordinary indicati...
متن کاملIndicative Conditionals and Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal logic and dynamic ep...
متن کاملEntrenchment of Knowledge Types 1 On the epistemic entrenchment of different types of knowledge expressed as conditionals in belief revision tasks
On the epistemic entrenchment of different types of knowledge expressed as conditionals in belief revision tasks Renée Elio Abstract Some belief revision theories appeal to the notion of epistemic entrenchment as a guide to choosing among alternative ways of removing inconsistency that new information may cause with existing beliefs. While belief revision theorists may not be interested in natu...
متن کاملOn the Modelling of an Agent's Epistemic State and its Dynamic Changes
Given a set of unquantified conditionals considered as default rules or a set of quantified conditionals such as probabilistic rules, an agent can build up its internal epistemic state from such a knowledge base by inductive reasoning techniques. Besides certain (logical) knowledge, epistemic states are supposed to allow the representation of preferences, beliefs, assumptions etc. of an intelli...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Synthese
دوره 162 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008