Sequential effects: Superstition or rational behavior?

نویسندگان

  • Angela J. Yu
  • Jonathan D. Cohen
چکیده

In a variety of behavioral tasks, subjects exhibit an automatic and apparently suboptimal sequential effect: they respond more rapidly and accurately to a stimulus if it reinforces a local pattern in stimulus history, such as a string of repetitions or alternations, compared to when it violates such a pattern. This is often the case even if the local trends arise by chance in the context of a randomized design, such that stimulus history has no real predictive power. In this work, we use a normative Bayesian framework to examine the hypothesis that such idiosyncrasies may reflect the inadvertent engagement of mechanisms critical for adapting to a changing environment. We show that prior belief in non-stationarity can induce experimentally observed sequential effects in an otherwise Bayes-optimal algorithm. The Bayesian algorithm is shown to be well approximated by linear-exponential filtering of past observations, a feature also apparent in the behavioral data. We derive an explicit relationship between the parameters and computations of the exact Bayesian algorithm and those of the approximate linear-exponential filter. Since the latter is equivalent to a leaky-integration process, a commonly used model of neuronal dynamics underlying perceptual decision-making and trial-to-trial dependencies, our model provides a principled account of why such dynamics are useful. We also show that parameter-tuning of the leaky-integration process is possible, using stochastic gradient descent based only on the noisy binary inputs. This is a proof of concept that not only can neurons implement near-optimal prediction based on standard neuronal dynamics, but that they can also learn to tune the processing parameters without explicitly representing probabilities.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Superstition and Rational Learning by Superstition and Rational Learning

We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true, so it seems to have relied on the superstition that the guilty are more likely to drown than the inn...

متن کامل

Superstition and Rational Learning

We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. According to our theory a mechanism that uses superstitions two or more steps off the equilibrium pa...

متن کامل

Superstition and Rational Learning

We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true, so it seems to have relied on the superstition that the guilty are more likely to drown than the inn...

متن کامل

STUDYING THE BEHAVIOR OF SOLUTIONS OF A SECOND-ORDER RATIONAL DIFFERENCE EQUATION AND A RATIONAL SYSTEM

In this paper we investigate the behavior of solutions, stable and unstable of the solutions a second-order rational difference equation. Also we will discuss about the behavior of solutions a the rational system, we show these solutions may be stable or unstable.  

متن کامل

Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi

The code of Hammurabi specified a “trial by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is based on a superstition: We do not believe that the guilty are any more likely to drown than the innocent. Second, if people can be easily persuaded to hold a superstitious belief, why such an elaborate mechanism? Why not ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Advances in neural information processing systems

دوره 21  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008