Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel & Moldovanu (1995a) by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers.
منابع مشابه
Bargaining with Externalities∗
This paper studies bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers with externalities. A full characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria exist for generic parameter values, with delay only for strong positive externalities. The outcome is efficient if externalities are not too positive. Increasing the bargaining power of the seller de...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 65 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009