Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms
نویسندگان
چکیده
We propose two simple mechanisms that implement two bargaining sets in super-additive environments. The first bargaining set is a close variation of the one Ž . proposed by L. Zhou 1994, Games Econom. Beha ̈. 6, 512]526 , and the second is Ž the Pareto optimum payoffs of the A. Mas-Colell 1989, J. Math. Econom. 18, . 129]139 bargaining set. We adopt a simple framework in which the cooperative outcomes are realized as non-cooperative subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies of a two-stage game played by an auxiliary set of individuals competing over the cooperative agents. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72. Q 2000 Academic Press
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 31 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000