Cramton Strategic Delay in Bargaining

Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty

The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others’ preferences. This paper explores, within the context of an infinite-horizon bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty, how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible. Since ...

Sequential bargaining mechanisms

A fundamental problem in economics is determining how agreements are reached in situations where the parties have some market power. Of particular interest are questions of efficiency and distribution: • How efficient is the agreement? • How can efficiency be improved? • How are the gains from agreement divided among the parties? Here, I explore these questions in the context of bilateral monop...

Unions, Bargaining and Strikes

Working Paper Department of Economics Cheap Talk Car Matter If

This paper describes an intuitive way in which cheap talk can matter in a two-stage bargaining game in which talk may be followed by serious negotiation. The intuition that all buyers would claim to have low reservation prices is incorrect in our model. Instead, the paper emphasizes that if good-faith participation is endogenously determined then the parties can use talk to trade, off bargainin...

Bargaining Under Strategic Uncertainty

This paper provides a novel understanding of delays in reaching agreements based on the idea of strategic uncertainty—i.e., the idea that a Bargainer may face uncertainty about her opponent’s play, even if there is no uncertainty about the structure of the game. It considers a particular form of strategic uncertainty, called on path strategic certainty. On path strategic certainty is the assump...