False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks

We study the problem of finding a recommendation for an uninformed user in a social network by weighting and aggregating the opinions offered by the informed users in the network. In social networks, an informed user may try to manipulate the recommendation by performing a false-name manipulation, wherein the user submits multiple opinions through fake accounts. To that end, we impose a no harm axiom: false-name manipulations by a user should not reduce the weight of other users in the network. We show that this axiom has deep connections to false-nameproofness. While it is impossible to design a mechanism that is best for every network subject to this axiom, we propose an intuitive mechanism LEGIT, and show that it is uniquely optimized for small networks. Using real-world datasets, we show that our mechanism performs very well compared to two baseline mechanisms in a number of metrics, even on large networks.