Critical Notice of Lucy O ’ Brien , Self - Knowing Agents

What is the relation between first-person thought and self-consciousness? On one view, grasp of the first person is based on acquaintance with the self. Self-consciousness makes first-person reference possible, in much the same way in which perceptual acquaintance with objects of ‘outer sense’ makes perceptual demonstratives such as ‘this lemon’ available to us. The ‘perceptual demonstrative model’ of first-person reference is widely regarded as discredited though. It is not just that the task of demystifying the idea of acquaintance with the self presents formidable challenges. Nor is the problem just that the ‘perceptual demonstrative model’ is hard to reconcile with certain basic features of first-person thought, such as its immunity to reference failure. The fact is that in contrast to perceptual demonstratives, the first person is a token reflexive. The reference of any serious use of ‘I’ is determined by a completely general rule, the self-reference rule (SRR): ‘I’ refers to whoever uses it. It is not determined by acquaintance with the object referred to. Grasp of the first person is a matter of being able to use an expression or concept governed by SRR. Lucy O’Brien’s Self-Knowing Agents offers, among many other things, a rich and subtle critique of what she calls the ‘self-reference approach’ to the first person. O’Brien acknowledges that the approach marks an important advance over the ‘perceptual demonstrative model.’ Her dissatisfaction with it stems from its perceived failure to address, let alone answer, what she thinks of as the deepest and most important question in this area: the question of how to understand the relation between grasp of the first person and self-consciousness. O’Brien calls her proposed alternative to, or supplementation of, the selfreference approach the ‘agency account.’ The account is intended to illustrate and substantiate the general thesis that activity, both psychological and physical, ‘has an important role to play in addressing some of the central problems that subjectivity presents us with’ (vii). In O’Brien’s view, philosophers grappling with the problems of subjectivity have tended to make these difficult problems more difficult still by paying insufficient attention to the fact that we are active creatures. The first part of the book looks at the specific problem of first-person reference. The second part contains additional material on the nature and first-person epistemology of bodily action and on bodily awareness. Here I will focus on O’Brien’s treatment of the first person. Her distinctive emphasis on the connection between the first person and self-consciousness