Do Monitors Monitor? Write-offs and Corporate Governance
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper examines the impact of Corporate Governance and CEO turnover on the writeoff decision, as well as the motivation for companies to take write-offs. Companies with poor monitoring mechanisms take write-offs due to endogenous factors Conversely, companies with strong monitoring mechanisms take write-offs because of exogenous factors, like negative industry shocks. These ”good write-offs” lead to an increase in earnings transparency and result in positive announcement effects, as well as improved liquidity and performance.
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تاریخ انتشار 2003