Pre-Vote Negotiations in Binary Aggregation
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study voting games on possibly interconnected issues, where voters might hold a principled opinion about a subset of the issues at stake while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones, and can influence one another before casting their ballots in order to obtain an individually more favourable outcome. We analyse voters’ rational behaviour in a two-phase game, allowing players to undergo a negotiation phase before their vote, and showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the pre-vote phase.
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